PT ESC Threat Intelligence
APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Specialists at the PT Expert Security Center have been monitoring the Cloud Atlas group since May 2019.
The goals of the group are espionage and theft of confidential information.
The group typically uses phishing emails with malicious attachments as the initial vector for their attacks.
In the third quarter of 2022, during our investigation we identified a phishing campaign targeting employees of Russian government agencies.
The attackers used targeted mailing based on the professional field of the recipients, even though we found no publicly available information about them.
We first knew about the attackers back in 2014, when Kaspersky researchers published a report.
Since then, their tools have not changed much (you can find more about them in the "Malware analysis" section).
However, there has not yet been a detailed analysis and description of the functionality of these tools.
In this report, we'll discuss the main techniques of the Cloud Atlas group, and take an in-depth look at the tools they use.
Read full reportTgRAT
During an investigation, Positive Technologies Expert Security Center (PT ESC) discovered a hacking toolkit that used the Telegram messaging app to manage backdoors. To penetrate the network and move laterally within it, attackers used both known malware, such as Impacket, Mimikatz, and network traffic tunneling tools (Chisel , dnscat2 , Gost , and others), and new, less widespread malware, such as remote access Trojans that use Telegram API to download data. Malware analysis was performed by the cyberthreat research team (PT ESC).
Read full reportFlying in the clouds: APT31 renews its attacks on Russian companies through cloud storage
In April 2022, PT Expert Security Center detected an attack on a number of Russian media and energy companies that used a malicious document called «list.docx» to extract a malicious payload packed with VMProtect. Having analyzed the network packet, we found it to be identical to the one we studied in our report on APT31 tools, suggesting that these may belong to one and the same group. The malware samples date from November 2021 to June 2022.
Detailed analysis of the tools showed the use of the Yandex.Disk service as the C2 server. This seemed a rather curious case to us, since it involved a potentially foreign group using a Russian service specifically to make the network load look outwardly legitimate.
This group's previous use of the Dropbox cloud service, as well as overlaps with the above-mentioned tools, suggests that here too we are dealing with the toolkit of the APT31 group.
This report describes the tools and techniques and their features, discusses the similarities and differences, and lays out the characteristics on which basis we assigned them to the APT31 group.
Read full reportSpace Pirates: analyzing the tools and connections of a new hacker group
At the end of 2019, Positive Technologies Expert Security Center (PT ESC) found a phishing email aimed at a Russian aerospace enterprise. It contained a link to previously unknown malware. Our experts discovered the same malware in 2020 when investigating an information security incident at a Russian government agency. During the investigation, several new malware families using a common network infrastructure were also discovered, some of which had not previously been mentioned in open sources.
In the summer of 2021, PT ESC revealed traces of compromise of another Russian aerospace enterprise. The organization was duly informed. As a result of the investigation, we found connections to the same network infrastructure on its computers. Further research made it possible to identify at least two more organizations in Russia, both partially state-owned, that were attacked using the same malware and network infrastructure.
We could not unambiguously link the detected malicious activity to any known hacker group, so we gave the attackers a new name—Space Pirates. The reason for the name was the P1Rat string used in the PDB paths, and the targeting of the aerospace industry. This report describes the group's detected activity, the features of the malware it uses, as well as its connection with other APT groups.
Read full reportMasters of Mimicry: new APT group ChamelGang and its arsenal
In Q2 2021, the PT Expert Security Center incident response team conducted an investigation in an energy company. The investigation revealed that the company's network had been compromised by an unknown group for the purpose of data theft. To achieve their goal, the attackers used a penetration method—trusted relationship. The group compromised a subsidiary and penetrated the target company's network through it.
After investigating the first incident, on August 16, 2021, as part of threat intelligence of the newly discovered group, PT ESC specialists detected another successful attack (server compromise), identified a new victim, and notified the affected organization. This time, the criminals attacked a Russian company from the aviation production sector, and used a chain of ProxyShell vulnerabilities for penetration.
Read full reportAPT31 new dropper. Target destinations: Mongolia, Russia, the U.S., and elsewhere
PT Expert Security Center (PT ESC) specialists regularly track the activity of hacker groups and the emergence of new information security threats (threat intelligence). During such monitoring in April 2021, a mailing list with previously unknown malicious content was sent to Mongolia. Similar attacks were subsequently identified in Russia, Belarus, Canada, and the United States. According to PT ESC threat intelligence analysts, from January to July 2021, approximately 10 attacks were carried out using the discovered malware samples. A detailed analysis of malware samples, data on the paths on which working directories and registry keys were located, techniques and mechanisms used by the attackers (from the injection of malicious code to the logical blocks and structures used) helped correlate this malware with the activity of the APT31 group.
In this article, we will study the malware created by the group, focus in more detail on the types of droppers discovered and the tricks used by its developers. We will also present the criteria on the basis of which the attacks were attributed.
Read full reportLazarus Group Recruitment: Threat Hunters vs Head Hunters
At the end of September 2020, Positive Technologies Expert Security Center (PT ESC ) was involved in the investigation of an incident in one of the largest pharmaceutical companies. After starting to analyze the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the attackers, the investigation team found similarities with the Lazarus Group attacks previously described in detail by cybersecurity experts in the reports "Operation: Dream Job" and "Operation (노스 스타) North Star A Job Offer That's Too Good to be True?".
This article describes a previously unknown attack by the APT group, reveals the Lazarus Group's TTPs that allowed attackers to obtain full control over a pharmaceutical company's infrastructure in just four days, as well as the tools used by the attackers for preliminary compromise, network reconnaissance, and gaining persistence in the infrastructure of the targeted company.
At the end of the article, PT ESC provides a list of the group's TTPs and indicators of compromise that can be used by cybersecurity specialists to identify traces of the group's attacks and search for threats in their infrastructure.
Read full reportPaaS, or how hackers evade antivirus software
Malware is one of the main tools of any hacking group. Depending on the level of qualification and the specifics of operation, hackers can use both publicly available tools (such as the Cobalt Strike framework) and their own developments.
Creating a unique set of tools for each attack requires huge resources; therefore, hackers tend to reuse malware in different operations and also share it with other groups. The mass use of the same tool inevitably leads to its getting on the radar of antivirus companies, which, as a result, reduces its efficiency.
To prevent it from happening, hackers use code packing, encryption, and mutation techniques. Such techniques can often be handled by separate tools called crypters or sometimes simply packers. In this article, we will use the example of the RTM
banking trojan to discuss which packers attackers can use, how they complicate detection of the malware, and what other malware they can pack.
Read full reportHigaisa or Winnti? APT41 backdoors, old and new
The PT Expert Security Center regularly spots emerging threats to information security, including both previously known and newly discovered malware. During such monitoring in May 2020, we detected several samples of new malware that at first glance would seem to belong to the Higaisa group. But detailed analysis pointed to the Winnti group (also known as APT41, per FireEye) of Chinese origin. Subsequent monitoring led us to discover a number of new malware samples used by the group in recent attacks. These include various droppers, loaders, and injectors; Crosswalk, ShadowPad, and PlugX backdoors; and samples of a previously undescribed backdoor that we have dubbed FunnySwitch. We can confidently state that some of these attacks were directed at a number of organizations in Russia and Hong Kong.
In this article, we will share the results of our investigation of these samples and related network infrastructure, as well as overlaps with previously described attacks.
Read full reportInvestigation with a twist: an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction
In late April 2020, a client invited the CSIRT incident response team at the Positive Technologies Expert Security Center (PT ESC) to investigate a network compromise that resulted in encryption of files on servers and employee workstations.
We initially assumed that this was yet another attack on corporate networks with a common variety of ransomware. However, what we found was different: this intrusion was the work of a well-known Asian APT group implicated in cyberespionage against government targets. The initial successful compromise had taken place two years prior.
In this article, we will share the results of our investigation of this targeted attack, which started with the compromise of a foreign office. Ultimately, we succeeded in bringing the infrastructure back to a secure condition and reversing the damage that had been done.
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